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CHAPTER 4
Safeguarding of U.S. National Interests
in the Maritime Environment
4.1 INTRODUCTION

T

his final chapter of Part I-Law of Peacetime Naval
Operations-examines the broad principles of international law that
govern the conduct of nations in protecting their interests at sea during time of
peace. As noted in the priface, this publication provides general information. It is not
directive, and does not supersede guidance issued by the commanders of the combatant
commands, and in particular any guidance they may issue that delineates the circumstances
and limitations under which the forces under their command will initiate and/or continue
engagement with otherforces encountered.
Historically, international law governing the use offorce between natio{ls has
been divided into rules applicable in peacetime and rules applicable in time of
war.1 In recent years, however, the concepts of both "war" and "peace" have
become blurred and no longer lend themselves to clear definition. 2
Consequendy, it is not always possible to try to draw neat distinctions between
the two. Full scale hostilities continue to break out around the world, but few are
accompanied by a formal declaration of war. 3 At the same time, the spectrum of
anned conflict has widened and become increasingly complex. 4 At one end of
that spectrum is total nuclear war; at the other, insurgencies and state-sponsored
terrorism. 5 For the purposes of this publication, however, the conduct of anned
1. 2 Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis 832 (Kelsey, transl. 1925).
2. McDougal & Feliciano 7-9.
3. A number of reasons have been advanced as to why nations conduct hostilities without a
fonnal declaration of war: (1) a desire to avoid being branded as aggressors and later being
compelled to pay reparations; (2) a desire to avoid triggering the sanctions and peace enforcement
provisions of Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter; (3) the "outlawry" ofwar by art. 2 ofboth
the Kellogg-Briand Pact of1928 and the U.N. Charter of1945; (4) the post-World War II war
crimes trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo; (5) the fear of embargo on war supplies under national
legislation ofneurral countries; and (6) the fear held by an attacked weaker nation of widening
localized hostilities. Stone 311. See also von Glahn, Law Among Nations 712-715 (6th ed. 1992);
and paragraph 7.1 and note 6 (p. 366).
4. Kidron & Smith, The War Atlas: Armed Conflict-Armed Peace (1983); McDougal &
Feliciano 97-120.
5. Terry, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-Policy Analysis, 36 Nav. L. Rev.
159 (1986); Terry, An Appraisal ofLawful Military Response to State-Sponsored Terrorism, Nav.
War ColI. Rev., May-June 1986, at59; Somer, Terrorism, The Law, and the National Defense,
(continued...)
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hostilities involving U.S. forces, irrespective of character, intensity, or duration,
is addressed in Part II-Law of Naval Warfare.
4.1.1 Charter of the United Nations. Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter of
the United Nations6 provides that:
All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaciful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

Article 2, paragraph 4, provides that:
All Members shall refrain in their international relationsfrom the threat or use ifforce against
the territorial integrity or political independence if any state, or in any other manner
7
inconsistent with the Purposes if the United Nations.

In combination, these two provisions establish the fundamental principle of
modem international law that nations will not use force or the threat of force to
impose their will on other nations or to otherwise resolve their international
differences.
Under Chapter VI of the Charter, the Security Council has a number of
measures short of the use of force available to it to facilitate the peaceful
settlement of disputes. If, however, the dispute constitutes a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, Article 39 of the Charter provides:
The Security Council shall determine the existence if any threat to the peace, breach if the
peace, or act ifaggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be

5.(... continued)
126 Mil. L. Rev. 89 (1989); and Joyner, In Search of an Anti-Terrorism Policy: Lessons from the
Reagan Era, 11 Terrorism 29 (1988). See also U.N.G.A. Res. A/49/60, Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, 17 Feb. 1995, reprinted in 10 Terrorism/Documents ofInternational and
Local Control (Levie ed. 1996) at 13.
6. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, as
amended in 1963 (16 U.S.T. 1134, T.I.A.S. 5857),1965 (19U.S.T. 5450, T.I.A.S. 6529) and 1971
(24 U.S.T. 2225, T.I.A.S. 7739) reprinted in AFP 110-20 at 5-2.1. As ofl November 1997, 186
nations were members ofthe United Nations. The few nations not members ofthe United Nations
include Kiribati, Nauru, Switzerland, Tonga, and Tuvalu.
7. The purposes of the U.N. Charter are set forth in art. 1. They include:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace.
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taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
. 8
secuTtty.

Such decisions of the Security Council are implemented under Article 41 or
Article 42 of the Charter. Article 41 provides:
The Security Council may deride what measures not involving the use ifarmedforce are to be
employed to give dfect to its derisions, and it may call upon the Members . .. to apply such
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption if economic relations and if
rail, sea, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means ifcommunication, and the severance if
diplomatic relations.
8. The key provisions of the Charter relating to the role of the Security Council in the
maintenance of international peace and security are as follows:
CHAPTER V. TI,e Security Council
Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council
acts on their behal£ ...
Article 25
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.
CHAPTER VII. Aaion with Respea to 71Ireats to the Peace,
Breadles if the Peace, and Acts if Aggression
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence ofany threat to the peace, breach ofthe
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are
to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and ofrail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means ofcommunications, and the
severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such.action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.
(continued...)
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8.(... continued)
Article 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and
in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, anned forces, assistance, and facilities,
including rights ofpassage, necessary for the prupose ofmaintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their
degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be
provided ....

Article 45
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold
immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement
action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements
referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff
Committee.
Article 46
Plans for the application of anned force shall be made by the Security Council with the
assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Article 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security
Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the
maintenance ofinternational peace and security, the employment and command offorces placed at
its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the ChiefS of Staff of the permanent
members of the Security Council or their representatives ....
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the
strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council ....
Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the
maintenance ofinternational peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United
Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations direcdy and
through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying
out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.
The members of the United Nations have not yet been able to conclude agreements in accordance
with art. 43 and related Charter provisions. Instead, the United Nations, acting through the
Secretary General, has from time to time requested members to voluntarily constitute emergency
international U.N. peacekeeping forces as the need arose. In this way, the United Nations has sent
peacekeeping forces to trouble spots around the world on 46 occasions. See Annex A4-1 (p. 267)
for a current listing of all U.N. peacekeeping operations since 1947. See U.N., The Blue Helmets:
A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (1985); New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
United Nations Handbook (1991); and Fact Sheet: UN Peace-keeping Operations, U.S. Dep't of
(continued ...)
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Article 42 provides that:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or landforces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
Members . ...

These provisions do not, however, extinguish a nation's right of individual
and collective self-defense. Article 51 of the Charter provides, that:
Nothing in the . . . Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member . .. until the Securil)' Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. ...
8.(...continued)
State Dispatch, Sept. 30,1991, at 722. See also Bowett, United Nations Forces (1964); Boyd,
United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: A Military and Political Appraisal (1971); Siekmann,
Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-Keeping Forces (1985), and Daniel &
Hayes, Securing Observance of UN Mandates through the Employment of Military Forces,
Strategic Research Department Report 3-95, Nav. War ColI. (1995); Daniel & Hayes, Beyond
Traditional Peacekeeping (1995); Nordquist, What Color Helmet?: Refonning Security Council
Peacekeeping Mandates, The Newport Papers, No. 12, U.S. Nav. War ColI. 1997. The U.N.
Dep't of Peacekeeping maintains a useful website at WWW.UN.ORG/DEPTSIDPKO/.
9. With the exception of the Korean War (see Stone at 228-37) and various peacekeeping
activities (see note 8) armed forces have not been assigned to U.N. Command. Until August 1990,
the veto power exercised by the permanent members of the Security Council prevented the
Council from being able to carry out effectively, or in the manner contemplated by the framers of
the Charter, its role in the maintenance of international peace and security. As a result, member
nations have relied upon their inherent right of individual and collective self-defense to deter
aggression and maintain international peace and security. The Security Council's authorization to
use force to expel Iraq from Kuwait is recounted in Walker, The Crisis over Kuwait, August
1990-February 1991, 1991 Duke J. Int'IL. 25; and Moore, Crisis in the Gulf(1992). Self-defense is
discussed in paragraph 4.3.2 (p. 259). Nations continue to act in their own self-interest in a
horizontally structured world in which sovereignty plays an extremely important role.
Accordingly, recourse to individual and collective self-defense, as reflected in art. 51 of the
Charter, has become the norm. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in testifYing before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea (Hearings,
83d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 Jan. 1954, at 21), explained: "All of the security treaties which we have
made have been conceived ofas filling under Article 51." The full text of that art. provides:
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right ofindividual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right ofs6lf-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
(continued...)
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The following paragraphs discuss some of the measures that nations, acting in
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, may take in pursuing and
protecting their national interests during peacetime.
4.2 NONMILITARY MEASURES
4.2.1 Diplomatic. As contemplated by the United Nations Charter, nations
generally rely on peaceful means to resolve their differences and to protect their
9.(... continued)
Secretary Dulles testified further that:
[I]n the main, the arrangement that we have made has been under article 51, which is
one of broad and not necessarily regional scope, because the article which deals with
regional associations [article 53], as such, has a provision that no forcible action shall
be taken under thos regional agreements except with the consent of the Security
Council, and in view of the Soviet vto powr in the Security Council, it would result,
ifyou operated direcdy nder that regional-pact clause, you would not have the right
to resort to force or use force except with the consent of the Soviet Union.
"Regional arrangements" are specifically addressed in articles 52 and 53 of the Charter:
Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and
their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations....
Article 53
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security
CounciL ...
Secretary of State Rusk testified before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee on 25 August
1966:
The United Nations has not been able to deal effectively with all threats to the peace,
nor will it be able to do so as long as certain of its members believe they must
continue to compromise between their professed desire for peace and their short
range interest in achieving greater power or place in the world .... It was recognized
from the outset, however, that the United Nations might not prove able by itself to
carry the full burden of collective security. The Charter explicidy provides for the
existence of regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States,
which would deal with problems of international peace and security in their
respective areas. It also explicidy recognizes the inherent right ofboth individual and
collective self-defense.
Consistendy with the United Nations Charter, we [the United States] have entered
into multilateral and bilateral treaty arrangements with more than 40 countries on 5
continents.
(continued ...)
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interests. Diplomatic measures include all those political actions taken by one
nation to influence the behavior of other nations within the framework of
international law. They may involve negotiation, conciliation or mediation, and
may be cooperative or coercive (e.g., severing of diplomatic relations).10 The
behavior of an offending nation may be curbed by appeals to world public
opinion as in the General Assembly, or, if their misconduct endangers the
maintenance ofinternational peace and security, by bringing the issue before the
Security Council. Ordinarily, however, differences that arise between nations
are resolved or accommodated through the normal day-to-day, give-and-take of
international diplomacy. The key point is that disputes between the U.S. and
other nations arising out of conflicting interests are normally addressed and
resolved through diplomatic channels and do not involve resort to the threat or
use of force. 11
9.(... continued)
Quoted in U.S. Congo House Foreign Affairs Comm., Collective Defense Treaties, with maps,
Text of Treaties, A Chronology, Status of Forces Agreements, and Comparative Charts, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 15-17 (Comm. Print 1969).
The United States has entered into several mutual defense treaties that are currendy in force. The
NATO and Rio Treaties provide that an attack on one member nation is an attack on all and each
will assist in meeting the attack. The ANZUS, Philippine, Japanese, Korean, and SEATO Treaties
provide that an armed attack on any party would endanger its own peace and safety and that each
party will act to meet the common danger "in accordance with its constitutional processes."
10. 2 Restatement (Third), sec. 905, Comments & Reporters' Notes.
11. Under the U.S. Constitution, the President is responsible for the conduct of U.S. foreign
policy. In overseas areas, the President principally exercises that responsibility through the chief
U.S. diplomatic and consular representative to the country concerned, also known as the chief of
mission. The chief of mission is required, under the direction of the president, to exercise "full
responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision ofall Government employees in that
country (except for employees under the command ofa United States area military commander),"
to keep fully and currendy informed with respect to "all activities and operations of the
Government within that country," and to ensure that all government employees in that country
(except for employees under the command ofaU .S. area military commander) "comply fully with
all applicable directives of the chief of mission." Further, any U.S. government agency having
employees in a foreign country is required to "keep the chief of mission to that country fully and
currendy informed with respect to all activities and operations ofits employees in that country,"
and to "insure that all of its employees (except for employees under the command of a United
States area military commander) comply fully with all applicable directives ofthe chiefofmission."
22 U .S.C. sec. 3927 (1994). This requirement is included in each presidential letter ofinstruction
to chiefS of mission. That letter currendy (1994) includes the following:

As Commander in Chief, I retain authority over United States Armed Forces. On
my behalf you have responsiblity for the direction, coordination, supervision, and
safety, including secruity from terrorism, of all Defense Department personnel on
official duty [in (country)/at (international organization)], except those personnel
under the command ofaU .S. area military commander. You and such commanders
must keep each other currendy informed and cooperate on all matters of mutual
interest. Any differences that cannot be resolved in the field should be reported by
(continued...)
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4.2.2 Economic. Nations often utilize economic measures to influence the
actions of others. The granting or withholding of "most favored nation" status to
another country is an often used measure of economic policy. Similarly, trade
agreements, loans, concessionary credit arrangements and other aid, and
investment opportunity are among the many economic measures that nations
extend, or may withhold, as their national interests dictate. 12 Examples of the
coercive use of economic measures to curb or otherwise seek to influence the
conduct of other nations include the suspension of u.S. grain sales and the
embargo on the transfer ofU.S. technology to the offendin§ nation, 13 boycott of
oil and other export products from the offending nation, 1 suspension of "most
r:
. " status, an d the assertlon
. 0 f other econonuc
.sancnons.
.
15
Iavore d nanon
11. (... continued)
to the Secretary of State; area military conunanders should report to the Secretary of
Defense.
An extended version of President Clinton's letter ofinstruction to chiefS ofmission is at Annex A4-2
(p. 256). Under 10 U.S.c. sec. 162(a)(4) (1994) "[e]xcept as otherwise directed by the Secretary of
Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a unified combatant command
shall be assigned to, and under the command of, the commander of that command."
These requirements are implemented for deployed naval forces in U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990.
Art. 0911 provides that the senior officer present in a deployed naval force, insofar as possible, shall
preserve close relations with the diplomatic and consular representatives of the United States. Art.
0912 also provides that in the absence of a diplomatic or consular representatives of the United
States, the senior officer present in a foreign country has authority, among other things, to
communicate or remonstrate with foreign civil authorities as may be necessary. Further, art. 0914
provides that "[O]n occasions when injury to the United States or to citizens thereofis committed
or threatened in violation of the principles of international law or in violation of rights existing
under a treaty or other international agteement, the senior officer present shall consult with the
diplomatic or consular representatives of the United States, ifpossible, and shall take such action as
is demanded by the gravity of the situation." See paragraph 4.3.2.2 and accompany notes (p. 263)
for a discussion of actions to be taken by U.S. military conunanders in such circumstances.
On the matter of requests for asylum, see paragraph 3.3 (p. 216).
12. See 12 Whiteman 311-21, 2 Restatement (Third), sec. 905 Comment fat 382, and
Reporters' Note 8, at 300-01 for discussions of retorsion (unfriendly but lawful acts not involving
the use of force in response to objectionable acts of another nation), retaliation and reprisal.
13. The United States took these actions, among others, in its initial response to the December
25, 1979, invasion of Mghanistan by the Soviet Union. Presidential Address to the Nation, 4
January 1980, Dep't St. Bull., Jan. 1980, at B. This embargo was lifted in April 1981. Dep't St.
Bull., Oct. 1982, at 42. Similar actions were taken by the United States in December 1981, in
response to Soviet-inspired repression in Poland. Dep't St. Bull., Feb. 1982, at 8.
14. The United States took these actions against Libya in response to the continuing pattern of
Libyan activity to promote instability and terrorism which violates accepted international norms of
behavior. Exec. Order No. 12,538,3 C.F.R. 395-96 (1986); Proclamation No. 5141, 3 C.F.R.
143-44 (1984); Proclamation No. 4907, 3 C.F.R. 21-22 (1983) (these presidential documents are
reprinted in 19 U.S.C. sec. 1862 note (Supp. III 1985).
15. The United States took such actions against Nicaragua on 1 May 1985, Dep't St. Bull.,July
1985, at 74-75, underthe International Emergency Economic Powers Act of1977, 50 U.S. C. sec.
(continued...)
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4.2.3 Judicial. Nations may also seek judicial resolution of their peacetime
disputes, both in national courts and before international tribunals. A nation or
its citizens may bring a legal action against another nation in its own national
courts, provided the court has jurisdiction over the matter in controversy (such
as where the action is directed against property of the foreign nation located
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court) and provided the foreign nation
does not interpose a valid claim ofsovereign immunity. Similarly, a nation or its
citizens may bring a legal action against another nation in the latter's courts, or in
the courts of a third nation, Rrovided jurisdiction can be found and sovereign
.
..
.
d 16
Immuruty IS not mterpose .
Nations may also submit their disputes to the International Court ofJustice for
resolution. Article 92 of the United Nations Charter establishes the International
Court ofJustice as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. No nation
may bring another before the Court unless the latter nation first consents. That
consent can be general and given beforehand or can be given in regard to a
specific controversy. Nations also have the option ofsubmitting their disputes to
ad hoc or other established tribunals. 17
4.3 MILITARY MEASURES
The mission ofU .S. military forces is to deter armed attack against the United
States across the range of military operations, defeat an armed attack should
deterrence fail, and prevent or neutralize hostile efforts to intimidate or coerce
the United States by the threat or use of armed force or terrorist actions. 18 In
15.(... continued}

1701 et seq. (1982) and other statutory authority. See also Terry, The Iranian Hostages Crisis:
International Law and United States Policy, 32 JAG J. 31, 53-56 (1982). The United States'
unilateral economic reaction to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 involved the freezing
of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets by Executive Orders 12722-23, 3 C.F.R. 294-96 (1991). More
recendy, sanctions have been imposed on Cuba (see. e.g. 22 U.S.C. sec. 6005 (1996)} and Bosnia
(see U.N.S.C. Res. 757 (30 May 1992)}.
16. On sovereign immunity see DA Pam 27-161-1, at chap. 5; Franck & Glennon, Foreign
Relations and National Security Law: Cases, Materials and Simulations 214-26 (1987); Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law 322-45 (4th ed. 1990). The United States has waived its
sovereign immunity in certain types of cases. See, e.g., the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. sec. 781 et
seq., the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. sec. 741 et seq., and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. sec. 2671 et seq. The United States respects assertions of sovereign immunity by foreign
sovereigns. Foreign Immunities Act of1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. secs. 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602 et seq. (1994)}.
17. Fora comprehensive analysis of the International Court ofJustice and a discussion ofmajor
cases brought before it, see Rosenne, The World Court: What it is and how it works (5th ed. 1995).
See also paragraph 10.2.1, note 1 (p. 10-1) fora discussion ofthe I.CJ. 8July 1996 Advisory Opinion
on the Legality of the T1Ireat or Use of Nudear Weapons.
18. See National Security Strategy of the United States, "A National Security of Engagement
and Enlargement" The White House, Feburary 1995, at 1-12.
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order to deter armed attack, U.S. military forces must be both capable and ready,
and must be perceived to be so by potential aggressors. Equally important is the
perception of other nations that, should the need arise, the U.S. has the will to
use its forces in individual or collective self-defense. 19
4.3.1 Naval Presence. U.S. naval forces constitute a key and unique element of
our national military capability. The mobility of forces operating at sea
combined with the versatility of naval force composition-from units operating
individually: to multi-battle group formations-provide the National Command
20
Authorities with the flexibility to tailor U.S. military presence as circumstances
may reqUlre.
Naval presence, whether as a showing of the flag during port visits or as forces
deployed in response to contingencies or crises, can be tailored to exert the
precise influence best suited to U.S. interests. Depending upon the magnitude
and immediacy of the problem, naval forces may be positioned near areas of
potential discord as a show of force or as a symbolic expression of support and
concern. Unlike land-based forces, naval forces may be so employed without
political entanglement and without the necessity of seeking littoral nation
consent. So long as they remain in international waters and international
airspace, U.S. warships and military aircraft enjoy the full spectrum of the high
seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, including the right to conduct naval
maneuvers, subject only to the requirement to observe international standards of
safety, to recognize the rights ofother ships and aircraft that may be encountered,
and to issue NOTAMs and NOTMARs21 as the circumstances may require.
Deployment of a carrier battle group into the vicinity of areas of tension and
augmentation of U.S. naval forces to deter interference with U.s. commercial
shipping in an area of armed conflict provide graphic illustrations of the use of
U.S. naval forces in peacetime to deter violations of international law and to
protect U.S. flag shipping. 22

19. See National Military Strategy; "A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement," the
Pentagon, 1995 at 8-16.
20. The tenn "National Command Authorities" is defined as "The President and the Secretary
ofDefense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA." Joint
Pub. 1-02.
21. The tenn "National Command Authorities" is defined as "The President and the Secretary
of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA." Joint
Pub. 1-02.
22. U.S. Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, "Naval Warfare" (1994) at 20-1; Watkins, The
Maritime Strategy, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc. Supp.,Jan. 1986, at 7-8; Neutze, Bluejacket Diplomacy:
AJuridical Examination of Naval Forces in Support of United States Foreign Policy, 32 JAG J. 81,
83 (1982).
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4.3.2 The Right of Self-Defense. The Charter of the United Nations
recognizes that all nations enjoy the inherent23 right ofindividual and collective
self-defense24 against armed attack. 25 U.S. doctrine on self-defense, set forth in
the JCS Standing Rules ofEngagement for U.S. Forces, provides that the use of
force in self-defense against armed attack, or the threat of imminent armed
attack, rests upon two elements:
1. Necessity-The requirement that a use offorce be in response to a hostile act or
. 0 fh os til·
d emonstratIon
e mtent. 26
2. Proportionality-The requirement that the use offorce be in all circwnstances limited
in intensity, duration, and scope to that which is reasonably required to counter the
attlCk or threat of attack and to ensure the continued safety of u.s. forces?7

Customary intemationallaw has long recognized that there are circumstances
during time of peace when nations must resort to the use of armed force to
protect their national interests against unlawful or otherwise hostile actions by
23. The "inherent" right of self-defense refers to the right of self-defense as it existed in
customary international law when the UN Charter was written. See Brierly, The Law of Nations
416-21 (6th ed. 1963); Stone, at 244; von Glahn, Law Among Nations 129-33 (6th ed. 1992);
Harlow, The Legal Use of Force ... Short of War, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Nov. 1966, at 89;
Fairley, State Actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: Reopening Pandora's
Box, 10 Ga.]. Int'l & Compo L. 29 (1980); Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law (1958).
Compare Randelzhofer, Article 51, in The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary
661-78 (Simma ed. 1994).
24. See 2 Restatement (Third), sec. 905. Collective self-defense is considered in paragtaph
7.2.2 (p. 370).
25. While the literal EngIish language ofart . 51 limits self-defense to cases where "armed attack
occurs," State practice such as in the case ofthe 1962 Cuban Quarantine (see paragtaph 4.3.2, note
31 (p. 262» has generally recognized that "armed aggression" rather than "armed attack" justifies
the resort to self-defense; this position is supported by the equally authentic French text of art. 51:
"agcession armee." See Brierly and Randelzhofer, both at note 23. Anticipatory self-defense is
discussed in paragtaph 4.3.2.1 (p. 263). See also Dinstein, War, Aggcession and Self-Defense
187-91 (2d ed. 1994).
26. See SROE, para. 5d at Annex A4-3 (p. 277). 2 Restatement (Third), sec. 905(1)(a) &
Comment 3, at 387.
27. See SROE, para. 5d at Annex A4-3 (p. 277). 2 Restatement (Third), sec. 905(1)(b) &
Reporters' Note 3, at 388-89. See also Randelzhofer at 667 for a discussion of the principle of
proportionality (note 23). U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 0915, addressing the legality of resort
to the use of force against a foreign nation, reflects these principles:
1. The use of force in time of peace by United States naval personnel against another
nation or against anyone within the territories thereof is illegal except as an act of self-defense.
Naval personnel have a right ofself-defense against hostile acts and hostile intent (imminent threat
to use force). This right includes defending themselves, their subunits and, when appropriate,
defending U.S. citizens, their property and U.S. commercial assets in the vicinity.
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other nations. 28 A number of legal concepts have evolved over the years to
sanction the limited use of armed forces in such circumstances (e.g.,
.
.
29 emb argo, 30 mantlme
. .
. ) T 0 th e extent t h at suc h
mterventlon,
quarantlne.
27.(... continued)
2. The conditions calling for the application ofthe right ofself-defense cannot be precisely
defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment ofresponsible naval personnel who are
to perform their duties in this respect with all possible cate and forbearance. The use offorce must
be exercised only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to
accomplish the end required.
3. Force must never be used with a view to inflicting unlawful punishment for acts already
committed.
28. See Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 Am. J. Infl L. 259 (1989); Ronzitti,
Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of
Humanity (1985).
29. While difficult to define precisely, intervention is generally recognized in international law
as at least including the use offorce which results in the interference by one nation in matters under
the exclusive jurisdiction of another nation, for instance, interference in its domestic or foreign
affairs. It is also sometimes referred to as interference with the sovereignty of another nation.
Intervention frequently involves the nonperrnissive entry into the territory ofanother nation. Any
action constituting substantial interference with or hatasSment of a foreign private or public vessel
on the high seas may be considered as an impairment of the foreign nation's sovereignty.
Every nation has the obligation under international law to respect the sovereignty of every other
nation. A violation of that sovereignty by intervention is therefore a violation of international law
unless justified by a specific rule to the contrary, such as the rights of self-defense and of
humanitarian intervention to prevent a nation from committing atrocities against its own subjects
which is itself a violation of international law. There has been, however, considerable
disagreement over this latter rationale.
Intervention may be accomplished either with or without the use of force. Self-defense against
atffied attack or the threat of imminent attack is generally a necessary prerequisite for atffied
intervention. Intervention is justified under the following circumstances, which ate not all inclusive:
1. To protect nations that request intervention in the face of an external threat and
in certain other special cases. The intervention by the UnitedStates in the
Dominican Republic in 1965 is illustrative of this circumstance.
2. In response to a request from the government of one nation for assistance in
repelling threatened or attempted subversion directed by another nation. Examples of
this circumstance include the U.S. and British actions in Lebanon (1958) andJordan
(1957-58), and the U.S. actions in Vietnam (1963-75) and El Slavador (1981-86).
3. A serious danger to the territory ofa nation may arise either as a result ofa natural
catastrophe in another nation or as a result of the other nation deliberately or
negligently employing its natural resources to the detriment of the first nation. For
example, the reservoirs of Nation A on the upper reaches of a river might be
damaged by natural forces, posing a threat to Nation B on the lower reaches.
Intervention by the threatened nation (Nation B) is justified if the other nation
(Nation A) is unwilling or unable to provide a timely and effective remedy. The
U.N. Security Council should be immediately advised ofthe intervention (art. 51).
(continued ...)
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29.(... continued)
4. To protect the lives and property of a nation's citizens abroad, particularly its
diplomatic personnel. State practice has tolerated the use of force to protect a
nation's citizens outside its borders if the individuals were in imminent danger of
irreparable harm and the nation in whose territory the individuals were located
could not or would not protect them. The 1976 Israeli raid at Entebbe Airport, the
1977 West German raid at Mogadishu, Somalia, the 1980 U.S. Iranian hostage
rescue attempt, the 1983 U.S. intervention in Grenada and the 1988 U.S.
intervention in Panama are examples ofself-defense being asserted on behalf of one
nation's citizens in the territory of another.
5. In response to genocide or other compelling humanitarian circumstance. This
evolving concept ofhumanitarian intervention has not yet attained general acceptance.

See 1976 Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law 3-11; 2 Restatement (Third), sec. 905
Comment g, at 383; Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and
Intervention on Grounds of Humanity (1985); Dean, Self-Determination and U.S. Support of
Insurgents, A Policy-Analysis Model, 122 Mil. L. Rev. 149 (1988); Akehurst, Humanitarian
Intervention, in Intervention in World Politics 95 (Bull ed. 1984); and Teson, Humanitarian
Intervention (1995).
The Entebbe raid is discussed in Contemporary Practice of the U.S., 73 Am.]. Int'l L 122 (1979);
Salter, Commando Coup atEntebbe: Humanitarian Intervention or Barbaric Aggcession?, 11 Int'l
Lawyer 331 (1977); Boyle, International Law in Time of Crisis: From the Entebbe Raid to the
Hostages Convention, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 769 (1980); Boyle, The Entebbe Hostages Crisis, 29
Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 32 (1982). See also Green, Rescue at Entebbe-Legal Aspects, 6 Isr. Y.B.
Human Rights 312 (1976) and Ben-Porat, Haber & Schiff, Entebbe Rescue (1977).
The Iranian hostage rescue attempt is described in 78 Am.]. Int'l L. 200 (1984); U.N. Doc.
S/13908, 25 Aprll1980;JCS Special Operations Review Group, Rescue Mission Report, August
1990, reprinted in Aviation Week & Space Technology, 15 Sep. 1980, at 61-71,22 Sep. 1980, at
140-44,29 Sep. 1980, at 84-91; Carter, Keeping Faith 506-22 (1982); Brzezinski, Power and
Principle 487-500 (1985); Beckwith & Know, Delta Force (1983); Ryan, The Iranian Rescue
Mission: Why It Failed (1985); Kyle, The Guts to Try (1990); Terry, The Iranian Hostages:
International Law and United States Policy, 32JAG J. 31 (1982); and Green, The Tehran Embassy
Incident-Legal Aspects, 19 Archlv des Volkerrechts 1 (1980).
On United States intervention in El Salvador/Nicaragua in the 1980s, seeJoyner & Grimaldi, The
United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25
Va.J. Int'IL. 621 (1985); and Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future ofWorld
Order, 80 Am.]. Int'l L. 43-127 (1986).
The October 1983 Grenada operation is described in O'Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution,
Invasion and Aftermath (1984); The Grenada Papers-(Seabury & McDougall, eds. 1984);
American Intervention in Grenada: The Implication of Operation Urgent Fury (Dunn & Watson
eds. 1985); Spector, U.S. Marines in Grenada (1987); Lehman, Command of the Seas 291-305
(1988); Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada (1989); Weinberger, Fighting for Peace
101-33 (1990); Musicant, The Banana Wars 370-89 (1990); Leich, Current Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law: Rescue Operation by Armed Forces-Grenada, 78 Am.].
Int'l L. 200-04 (1984); U.N. Doc. S/16076, 25 October 1983; The United States Action in
Grenada, 78 Am.]. Int'l L. 131-75 (1984); Moore, Law and the Grenada Mission (1984); Maizel,
Intervention in Grenada, 35 JAG]. 47 (1986); and Beck, The "McNeil Mission" and the Decision
to Invade Grenada, Nav. War ColI. Rev., Spring 1991, at 93.
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concepts have continuing validity under the Charter of the United Nations, they
are premised on the broader principle of self-defense.
The concept of maritime quarantine provides a case in point. Maritime
quarantine was first invoked by the United States as a means of interdicting the
flow of Soviet strategic missiles into Cuba in 1962. That action involved a
limited coercive measure on the high seas applicable only to ships carrying
offensive weaponry to Cuba and utilized the least possible military force to
achieve that purpose. That action, formally ratified by the Organization of
American States (OAS), has been widely approved as a legitimate exercise of the
inherent right of individual and collective self-defense recognized in Article 51
31
of the UN Charter.
29.(... continued)
The December 1989 U.S. intervention in Panama is described in Musicant, The Banana Wars
390-417 (1990); Briggs, Operation Just Cause: Panama December 1989: A Soldier's Eyewitness
Account (1990); Woodward, The Commanders 83-195 (1991); Donnelly, Roth & Baker,
OperationJust Cause: The Storming ofPanama (1991); McConnell,Just Cause: The Real Story of
America's High-Tech Invasion of Panama (1991); Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story (1992).
OperationJust Cause is analyzed in Parkerson, United States Compliance with Humanitarian Law
Respecting Civilians During Operation Just Cause, 133 Mil. L. Rev. 31 (1991); and Terry, The
Panamanian Intervention: Law in Support of Policy, 39 Nav. L. Rev. 5 (1990).
On Operation Provide Comfort, relief to Iraqi Kurds in March 1991, see U.N. Security Council
Resolution 688 (1991).
30. In practice, the concepts ofembargo and boycott have become blurred and have taken on a
broader meaning. The terms now include preventing the import, export, movement or other
dealing in goods, services or financial transactions to exert pressure on an offending nation. An
embargo or boycott may be used, for example, to preclude an alleged aggressor nation from
increasing its war-making potential, or to prevent the aggravation ofcivil strife in a nation in which
it may be occurring. See 12 Whiteman 344-49. The maritime interception operations and air
embargo enforced against Iraq as a consequence ofits invasion of Kuwait, on 2 August 1990, are
summarized in Walker, The Crisis over Kuwait, August 1990-February 1991, 1991 Duke].
Compo & Int'l L. 25, 34-36. See also Joyner, Sanctions, Compliance and International Law:
Reflections on the United Nations' Experience Against Iraq, 32 Va.]. Int'l L. 1 (1991); and
Almond, An Assessment of Economic Warfare: Developments from the Persian Gulf, 31 Va.].
Int'l L. 645 (1991).
31. At the time, the U.S. Government characterized the quarantine as a sanction imposed by
collective agreement pursuant to art. 52 of the U.N. Charter, and did not rely on self-defense to
justifY its actions. Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crises and the Role of Law
(1974); Robertson, Blockade to Quarantine,JAG]"June 1963, at 87; McDevitt, The UN Charter
and the Cuban Quarantine, JAG J., April-May 1963, at 71; McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban
Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 Am. ]. Int'l L. 597 (1963); Christol & Davis, Maritime
Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated Material to Cuba,
1962, 57 Am. ]. Int'l L. 525; Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction:
National and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
335 (1962).
The 1990-91 maritime interception operations in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea by
Coalition Forces to prevent Iraqi imports and exports were conducted pursuant to U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 661 and 665 and art. 51 of the U.N. Charter. They are described in Carter,
Blockade, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Nov. 1990, at 42; and Delery, Away, the Boarding Party!, U.S.
Nav. Inst. Proc.lNaval Review, May 1991, at 65.
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4.3.2.1 Anticipatory Self-Defense. Included within the inherent right of
self-defense is the right of a nation (and its anned forces) to protect itself from
imminent attack. International law recognizes that it would be contrary to the
purposes of the United Nations Charter if a threatened nation were required to
absorb an aggressor's initial and potentially crippling first strike before taking
those military measures necessary to thwart an imminent attack. Anticipatory
self-defense involves the use of anned force where attack is imminent and no
reasonable choice of peaceful means is available. 32
4.3.2.2 JCS Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE). The JCS Standing
Rules of Engagement establish fundamental policies and procedures governing
the actions to be taken by U.s. commanders during military operations,
contingencies, or prolonged conflicts. (See also the discussion of SROE in the
Preface.) At the national level, rules of engagement are promulgated by the
NCA, through the Chairman of the Joint ChiefS of Staff, to the combatant
commanders to guide them in the employment of their forces toward the
achievement of broad national objectives. 33 At the tactical level, rules of
32. This is a departure from the treatment of this issue in NWP-9 (Rev. A) which stated:
Anticipatory self-defense involves the use of armed force where there is a clear
necessity that is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no reasonable choice of peaceful
means. [Emphasis added.]
That statement derives from U.S. Secretary ofState Daniel Webster's 1841 articulation ofthe right
to resort to self-defense as emanating from circumstances when the necessity for action is "instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice ofmeans, and no moment for deliberation." See TIle Caroline
Case, 2 Moore 409-14, discussed in Bunn, International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do
U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit?, Nav. War ColI. Rev., May-June 1986, at70; and Jennings,
TIle Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 Am. J. Int'l L. 82 (1938). The Webster formUlation is clearly too
restrictive today, particularly given the nature and lethality ofmodem weapons systems which may
be employed with little, if any, warning. Ascertaining when a modem weapons system's
employment may be "instant" or "overwhelming" is at best problematical. Moreover, as noted by
the Mallisons, "a credible threat may be imminent without being 'instant' and more than a
'moment for deliberation' is required to make a lawful choice of means." See Mallison & Mallison,
Naval Targeting: Lawful Objects of Attack, in Robertson at 263. McDougal and Feliciano, in
commenting on this issue, stated "the standard of required necessity has been habitually cast in
language so abstractly restrictive as almost, if read literally, to impose paralysis. Such is the clear
import of the classical peroration of Secretary of State Webster in TIle Caroline case .... [T]he
requirements of necessity and proportionality ... can ultimately be subjected only to that most
comprehensive and fundamental test ofall law , reasonableness in particular context." McDougal &
Feliciano 217-18. See also, Jessup, A Modem Law of Nations 163-64 (1948); Sofaer, Terrorism,
The Law, and the National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89 (1989); Joyner, The Rabta Chemical
Factory Fire: Rethinking the Lawfulness of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 Terrorism 79 (1990);
Dinstein, paragraph 4.3.2, note 25 (p. 259); and Lowe, The Commander's Handbook on the Law
of Naval Operations and the Contemporary Law of the Sea, in Robertson at 127-30.
33. Self-defense, in relation to the United States as a nation, is the act of defending the United
States and U.S. forces from attack or threat of imminent attack. See AnnexA4-3, para. 5b (p. 281).
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engagement are task and mission-oriented. At all levels, u.s. rules of
engagement are consistent with the law of armed conflict. 34 Because rules of
engagement also reflect operational and national policy factors, they often
restrict combat operations far more than do the requirements of international
law. A full range of options is reserved to the National Command Authorities to
determine the response that will be made to hostile acts and demonstrations of
33.( ... continued)
This concept relates to regional or global situations possibly preceding prolonged engagements and
related to unstable international relations. The concept of self-defense is also invoked in
confrontations between U.S. forces and foreign forces who are involved in an international anned
conflict both where the United States remains neutral or is otherwise not a party to the conflict and
where the United States is a party to the conflict. For a more detailed discussion ofneutrality and its
impact on naval operations, see Chapter 7. U.S. forces exercised national self-defense in response to
Libya's attacks on U.S. forces in the Gulf of Sidra on 24-25 March 1986, and to Libya's support for
international terrorism in the attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi on 14 April 1986. U.S. Letter to
U.N. Security Council, 25 March 1986, U.N. Doc. S/17938, reprinted in Dep't St. Bull., May
1986, at 80; Presidential Letters to Congress, 26 March 1986, 22 Weekly Compo Pres. Doc. 423;
Presidential Letters to Congress, 16 April 1986, reprinted in Dep't St. Bull., June 1986, at 8; U.S.
Letterto U.N. Security Council, 14 April 1986, U.N. Doc. S/17990. See also 80 Am.]. Int'lL. 632
(1986); Lehman, Command of the Seas 357-76 (1988); Weinberger, Fighting for Peace 175-201
(1990); Warriner, The Unilateral Use of Coercion Under International Law: A Legal Analysis of
the United States Raid on Libya on April 14, 1986,37 Nav. L. Rev. 49 (1988).
Documentation regarding the shooting down ofIran Air Flight 655 on 4 July 1988 is reproduced in
28 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 896 (1989); 83 Am.]. Int'l332 (1989), and discussed in Friedman, The Vincennes
Incident, U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc.lNaval Review, May 1989, at 72, and Hearings before the Defense
Policy Panel of the House Anned Service Committee, 9 Sep. 1988. See also Linman, Iran Air 655
and Beyond: Free Passage, Mistaken Self-Defense, and State Responsibility, 16 Yale]. Int'l L. 245
(1991).
34. Self-defense, in relation to a unit of U.S. naval forces, is the act of defending from attack or
threat of imminent attack that unit (including elements thereof) and other U.S. forces in the
vicinity, or U.S. citizens or U.S. flag vessels or other U.S. commercial assets in the vicinity of that
unit. See Annex A4-3, para. 5c (p. 281). Generally, this concept relates to localized, low-level
situations that are not preliminary to prolonged engagements. The response of two U.S. Navy
F-14 aircraft to the attack by two Libyan Su-22 aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra on 14 August 1981
was an exercise ofunit self-defense against a hostile force that had committed a hostile act and posed
a continuing threat of immediate attack. U.N. Doc. S/17938, 25 March 1986; Neutze, The Gulf
of Sidra Incident: A Legal Prespective, U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc.,Jan 1982, at 26; Parks, Crossing the
Line, U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc., Nov. 1986, at 40 & 43; Rather, The Gulf ofSidra Incident of1981: A
Study of the Lawfulness of Peacetime Aerial Engagements, 7 Yale J. Int'l L. 59 (1984). Similarly,
the shootdown of two Libyan MiG-23s on 4 January 1989 by two F-14s over international waters
of the Mediteranean Sea more than 40 miles off the eastern coast of Libya, after the MiGs
repeatedly turned toward them and did not break off the intercept, was an act of unit self-defense
against units demonstrating hostile intent. U.N. Doc. S/20366, 4 January 1989.
35. Grunawalt, The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge Advocate's Primer, 42 Air
Force L. Rev. 245 (1997); Roach, Rules ofEngagement, Nav. WarColl. Rev.,Jan.-Feb. 1983, at
46-53, reprinted in 14 Syr.]. Int'l L. & Com. 865 (1988); and Hayes, Naval Rules ofEngagement:
(continued ...)
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hostile intent. The SROE provide implementation guidance on the inherent
right and obligation of self-defense and the application of force for mission
accomplishment. 35 A principal tenet of these ROE is the commander's inherent
authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all
appropriate action in self-defense of the commander's unit and other U.S. forces
. h ... 36
In t e Vlclmty.

4.4 INTERCEPTION OF INTRUDING AIRCRAFT
All nations have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their national
airspace (see paragraphs 1.8 and 2.5.1). With the exception ofoverflight in transit
passage ofintemational straits and in archipelagic sea lanes passage (see paragraphs
2.3.3 and 2.3.4.1), distress (see paragraph 3.2.2.1), and assistance entry to assist
those in danger of being lost at sea (see paragraph 2.3.2.5), authorization must be
obtained for any intrusion by a foreign aircraft (military or civil) into national
airspace (see paragraph 2.5). That authorization may be flight specific, as in the
case of diplomatic clearance for the visit ofa military aircraft, or general, as in the
case of commercial air navigation pursuant to the Chicago Convention.
Customary international law provides that a foreign aircraft entering national
airspace without permission due to distress or navigational error may be required
to comply with orders to tum back or to land. In this connection the Chicago
Convention has been amended to provide, in effect:
1. That all nations must refrain from the use of weapons against civil aircraft, and,
in the case of the interception ofintruding civil aircraft, that the lives ofpersons on
board and the safety of the aircraft must not be endangered. (This provision does
not, however, detract from the right ofself-defense recognized under Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter.)
2. That all nations have the right to require intruding aircraft to land at some
designated airfield and to resort to appropriate means consistent with international
35.(... continued)
Management Tools for Crisis, Rand Note N-2963-CC (July 1989). See also Fleck, Rules of
Engagement for Maritime Forces and the Limitations of the Use of Force under the UN Charter,
31 Ger. Y.B. Int'l L. 165 (1988).
36. Contact with a foreign force committing a hostile act or armed attack or displaying hostile
intent or threat ofarmed attack against the United States, its forces, a U.S. flag vessel, U.S. citizens
or their property must be reported immediately by the fastest possible means to ]CS, CNO/CMC,
and the appropriate unified and component commanders (OPREP-1). Where circumstances
permit, guidance as to the use of armed force in defense should be sought. However, where the
circumstances are such that it is impractical to await such guidance, it is the responsibility of the
on-scene commander to take such measures ofself-defense to protect his force as are necessary and
proportional, consistent with applicable rules of engagement (see paragraph 4.3.2 (p. 259) and
Annex A 4-3 (p. 277».
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law to require intruding aircraft to desist from activities in violation of the
Convention.
3. That all intruding civil aircraft must comply with the orders given to them and
that all nations must enact national laws making such compliance by their civil
aircraft mandatory.
4. That all nations shall prohibit the deliberate use oftheir civil aircraft for purposes
37
(such as intelligence collection) inconsistent with the Convention.

The amendment was approved unanimously on 10 May 1984 and will come
into force upon ratification bl102 of ICAO's members in respect of those
nations which have ratified it. 3 The Convention, by its terms, does not apply to
intruding military aircraft. The U.S. takes the position that customary
international law establishes similar standards of reasonableness and
proportionality with respect to a nation's response to military aircraft that stray
into national airspace through navigational error or that are in distress39

37. Protocol relating to an amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation
[Art. 3 his], Montreal, 10 May 1984, reprinted in 23 Int'l Legal Mat'Is 705 (1984).
Para. 8.1 of Attachment A - Interception of Civil Aircraft - to Annex 2 - Rules of the Air - to the
Chicago Convention provides: "The use of tracer bullets to attract attention is hazardous, and it is
expected that measures will be taken to avoid their use so that the lives ofpersons on board and the
safety of aircraft will not be endangered."
Documentation regarding the shooting down ofKAL 007 is reproduced in 22 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is
FitzGerald, The Use of Force against Civil Aircraft: The Aftermath of the KAL Flight 007
Incident, 22 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 1984, at 291,309.
38. As of 4 November 1997, 90 nations have ratified the Protocol, including the United
Kingdom and the Russian Federation. See Table A4-1 (p. 4-33). The Protocol has not been
submitted to the Senate for advice and consent because of concerns about I.Cl compulsory
jurisdiction.
39. AFP 110-31, para. 2-5d, at 2-6; 9 Whiteman 328. On aerial intrusions, see Hughes, Aerial
Intrusions by Civil Airliners and the Use of Force, 45 J. Air L. & Com. 595 (1980); Hassan, A Legal
Analysis of the Shooting of Korean Airlines Flight 007 by the Soviet Union, 49 J. Air L. & Com.
553 (1984); Laveson, Korean Airline Flight 007: Stalemate in International Aviation Law-A
Proposal for Enforcement, 22 San Diego L. Rev. 859 (1985); Phelps, Aerial Intrusions by Civil and
Military Aircraft in Time of Peace, 107 Mil. L. Rev. 255 (1985) and Schmitt, Aerial Blockades in
Historical, Legal and Practical Perspective, 2 U.S.A.F.A. J. Leg. Studies 21 (1991). See also the
Agreement Between the Government of the United States ofAmerica and the Government of the
Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention ofDangerous Military Activities, Moscow,
12 June 1989, reprinted in 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 879 (1989).
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ANNEXA4-1
UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

Indonesia - United Nations Consular Commission (CC) 1947-1948.

* Middle East - United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)
Jun 1948-date.
Greece - United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB)
1948.

*

India/Pakistan - United Nations Military Observer Group in India &
Pakistan (ONMOGIP) Jan 1949-date.

Korea - United Nations Command (ONC) 1950-1953.

Suez - United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) 1955-1967.

Middle East - First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEFI) Nov
1956-Jun 1967.

Lebanon - United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)Jun
1958-Dec 1958.

Congo - United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) Jul1960-Jun
1964.
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West New Guinea - United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea
(West Irian) (UNSF) Oct 1962-Apr 1963.

Yemen - United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) Jul
1963-Sep 1964.

*

Cyprus - United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
Mar 1964-date.

Dominican Republic - Mission of the Representative of the
Secretary-General In the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) May
1965-0ct 1966.
India/Pakistan - United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
(UNIPOM) Sep 1965-Mar 1966.

Middle East - Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) Oct
1973-JuI1979.

*

Golan Heights - United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
(UNDOF) Jun 1974-date.

*

Lebanon - United Nations Interior Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Mar
1978-date.
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Mghanistan/Pakistan - United Nations Good Offices Mission in Mghanistan
& Pakistan (UNGOMAP) Apr 1988-Mar 1990.
Iran/Iraq - United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)
(Aug 88-Feb 91.

Angola - United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) Jan
89-Jun 91.
Namibia - United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) Apr
1989-Mar 1990.
Central America - United Nations Observer Group in Central America
(ONUCA) Nov 1989-Jan 1992.

*

Iraq/Kuwait - United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
(UNIKOM) Apr 1991-date.

Angola - United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) J un
1991-Feb 1995.
El Salvador - United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) Jul
1991-Apr 1995.

* Western Sahara - United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western
Sahara (MINURSO) Sep 1991-date.
Cambodia - United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) Oct
1991-Mar 1992.

Cambodia - United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
Mar 1992-Sep 1993.

270

Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations

Fonner-Yugoslavia - United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Mar
1992-Dec 1995.
Somalia - United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) Apr
1972-Mar 1993.
Mozambique - United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
Dec 1992-Dec 1994.

Somalia - United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) Mar
1993-Mar 1995.
Rwanda/Uganda - United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
(UNOMUR) Jun 1993-Sep 1994.

*

Georgia - United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) Aug
1993-date.

Haiti - United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) Sep 1993-Jun 1996.

*

Liberia - United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) Sep
1993-date.

Rwanda - United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) Oct
1993-Mar 1996.

Chad/Libya - United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)
May-Jun 1994.

*

Tajikistan - United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)
Dec 1994-date.
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*

Angola - United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)
Feb 1995-date.
Croatia - United Nations Confidence Restoration Organization in Croatia
(UNCRO) Mar 1995-Jan 1996.

*

Former-Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia - United Nations Preventive
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) Mar 1995-date.

*

Bosnia & Herzegovina - United Nations Mission
Herzegovina (UNMIBH) Dec 1995-date.

*

Croatia - United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) Jan
1996-date.

*

Croatia - United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slovenia,
Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) Jan 1996-date.

*

Haiti - United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) JuI
1996-date.

NOTE:

*

10

Bosnia and

Indicates an on-going operation as of 1 January 1997.

Source: U.N. Dep't of Public Information.
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ANNEXA4-2
PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF
INSTRUCTION
R 300238Z SEP 94
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM
BT
UNCLAS STATE 265203
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO
UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF MISSION
1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT
CLINTON'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO UNITED STATES
CHIEFS OF MISSION (COMS), WHICH HE SIGNED ON SEPTEMBER
16. PLEASE SHARE IT WITH ALL MEMBERS OF YOUR MISSION.
YOU MAY EXPECT TO RECEIVE YOUR INDIVIDUAL, SIGNED
LETTER BY POUCH IN THE NEXT MONTH OR SO. QUESTIONS
OR COMMENTS ON THE LETTER MAY BE ADDRESSED TO THE
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT POLICY (FMPI MP), ROOM 7427NS,
202-647-7789.
2. BEGIN TEXT.
DEAR MR.lMADAM AMBASSADOR:
A) PLEASE ACCEPT MY BEST WISHES AND APPRECIATION FOR
YOUR EFFORTS AS MY PERSONAL REf'KESE('J1'A'h'{~ rru
(COUNTRYIINTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION).
B)WEAREATAMOMENTOFUNIQUEHISTORICOPPORTUNITY
FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR THE WORLD. WITH THE
END OF THE COLD WAR, WE ARE ENTERING AN ERA SO NEW
THAT IT HAS YET TO ACQUIRE A NAME. OUR TASK AS A NATION, AND YOURS AS CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES MISSION, IS
TO ENSURE THAT THIS NEW ERA IS ONE CONDUCIVE TO
AMERICAN PROSPERITY, TO AMERICAN SECURITY, AND TO
THE VALUES AMERICA SEEKS TO EXEMPLIFY. TO ACCOMPLISH
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THIS TASK I NEED YOUR FULL SUPPORT FOR THE THREE GOALS
OF MY FOREIGN POLICY THAT AIM TO KEEP OUR NATION
STRONG AT HOME AND ABROAD: RENEWING AND ADAPTING
AMERICA'S SECURITY ALLIANCES AND STRUCTURES; REBUILDING AND REVITALIZING THE AMERICAN ECONOMY;
AND PROMOTING DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.

C) YOU SHOULD GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION IN THE SECURITY
REALM TO HALTING ARMS PROLIFERATION, PREVENTING,
RESOLVING, AND CONTAINING CONFLICT, AND TO COUNTERING TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL CRIME; AND IN THE
ECONOMIC ARENA, TO OPENING AND EXPANDING MARKETS
FOR AMERICA'S EXPORTS. NO COUNTRY CAN BE EXEMPT
FROM UPHOLDING THE BASIC PRINCIPLES IN THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS; ALL SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT SHARED DEMOCRATIC VALUES ARE THE MOST
RELIABLE FOUNDATION FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE
UNITED STATES. FINALLY, I WILL NEED YOUR HELP AS MY
ADMINISTRATION SEEKS TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION TO ADDRESS GLOBAL PROBLEMS INCLUDING
THE ENVIRONMENT AND POPULATION, NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING, REFUGEES, MIGRATION, AND
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
D) ACHIEVING THESE GOALS WILL DEMAND A DYNAMIC
DIPLOMACY THAT HARNESSES CHANGE IN THE SERVICE OF
OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND VALUES. IT WILL REQUIRE US
TO MEET THREATS TO OUR SECURITY AND PRACTICE
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, AND TO ANTICIPATE THREATS TO
OUR INTERESTS AND TO PEACE IN THE WORLD BEFORE THEY
BECOME CRISES AND DRAIN OUR HUMAN AND MATERIAL
RESOURCES IN WASTEFUL WAYS. I HAVE ASKED YOU TO
REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES IN (COUNTRY)/AT (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION) BECAUSE I AM CONFIDENT THAT
YOU POSSESS THE SKILLS, DEDICATION, AND EXPERIENCE
NECESSARY TO MEET THE MANY CHALLENGES THAT THIS NEW
AND COMPLEX ERA PRESENTS. THIS LETTER OUTLINES YOUR
PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. I HAVE
INFORMED ALL DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY HEADS OF THESE
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INSTRUCTIONS, AND I KNOW YOU WILL RECEIVE THEIR FULL
SUPPORT.
E) I CHARGE YOU TO EXERCISE YOUR AUTHORITY WITH
WISDOM, JUSTICE, AND IMAGINATION. DRAMATIC CHANGE
ABROAD AND AUSTERITY HERE AT HOME HAVE PUT A
PREMIUM ON LEADERSHIP AND TEAMWORK. CAREFUL STEWARDSHIP OF YOUR MISSION'S RESOURCES STANDS IN THE
FOREFRONT OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES. I URGE YOU TO SEE
BUDGETARY STRINGENCY NOT AS A HARDSHIP TO BE
ENDURED BUT AS AN INCENTIVE TO INNOVATION.
F) AS MY REPRESENTATIVE, YOU, WITH THE SECRETARY OF
STATE, ASSIST ME IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MY CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF OUR
RELATIONS WITH (COUNTRY/INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION). I CHARGE YOU TO EXERCISE FULL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE DIRECTION, COORDINATION, AND SUPERVISION OF
ALL EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICES AND PERSONNEL IN
(COUNTRY)/AT (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION), EXCEPT
FOR PERSONNEL UNDER THE COMMAND OF A U.S. AREA
MILITARY COMMANDER, UNDER ANOTHER CHIEF OF MISSION
IN (COUNTRY) OR ON THE STAFF OF AN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION. THIS ENCOMPASSES ALL AMERICAN AND
FOREIGN NATIONAL PERSONNEL, IN ALL EMPLOYMENT
CATEGORIES, WHETHER DIRECT HIRE OR CONTRACT, FULLOR PART-TIME, PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY.
G) ALL EXECUTIVE BRANCH PERSONNEL UNDER YOUR
AUTHORITY MUST KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED AT ALL TIMES
OF THEIR CURRENT AND PLANNED ACTIVITIES, SO THAT YOU
CAN EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR
U.S. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS. YOU HAVB
THE RIGHT TO SEE ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO OR FROM
MISSION ELEMENTS, HOWEVER TRANSMITTED, EXCEPT THOSE
SPECIFICALLY EXEMPTED BY LAW OR EXECUTIVE DECISION.
H) AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF, I RETAIN AUTHORITY OVER U.S.
ARMED FORCES. ON MY BEHALF YOU HAVE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE DIRECTION, COORDINATION, SUPERVISION, AND
SAFETY, INCLUDING SECURITY FROM TERRORISM, OF ALL
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DEPARTl\tlENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL ON OFFICIAL DUTY (IN
(COUNTRY)/AT (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION), EXCEPT
THOSE PERSONNEL UNDER THE COMMAND OF A U.S. AREA
MILITARY COMMANDER. YOU AND SUCH COMMANDERS
MUST KEEP EACH OTHER CURRENTLY INFORMED AND
COOPERATE ON ALL MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. ANY
DIFFERENCES THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED IN THE FIELD
SHOULD BE REPORTED BY YOU TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE;
AREA MILITARY COMMANDERS SHOULD REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
I) EVERY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCY UNDER YOUR
AUTHORITY, INCLUDING THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MUST
OBTAIN YOUR APPROVAL TO CHANGE THE SIZE, COMPOSITION, OR MANDATE OF ITS STAFF. USE THIS AUTHORITY TO
RESHAPE YOUR MISSION IN WAYS THAT DIRECTLY SERVE
AMERICAN INTERESTS AND VALUES ....

j) THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS MY PRINCIPAL FOREIGN POLICY
ADVISER. UNDER MY DIRECTION, HE IS, TO THE FULLEST
EXTENT PROVIDED BY THE LAW, RESPONSmLE FOR THE
OVERALL COORDINATION AND SUPERVISION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES ABROAD. THE ONLY AUTHORIZED
CHANNEL FOR INSTRUCTIONS TO YOU IS THROUGH HIM OR
FROMME....
K) THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND, BY EXTENSION, CHIEFS OF
MISSION ABROAD MUST PROTECT ALL U.S. GOVERNMENT
PERSONNEL ON OFFICIAL DUTY ABROAD (OTHER THAN
THOSE PERSONNEL UNDER THE COMMAND OF A U.S. AREA
MILITARY COMMANDER) AND THEIR ACCOMPANYING DEPENDENTS. I EXPECT YOU TO TAKE DIRECT RESPONSmILITY
FOR THE SECURITY OF YOUR MISSION. I ALSO EXPECT YOU TO
SUPPORT STRONGLY APPROPRIATE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AND COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITIES THAT ENHANCE
SECURITY BOTH LOCALLY AND IN THE BROADER INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
L) YOU SHOULD COOPERATE FULLY WITH PERSONNEL OF THE
U.S. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES IN (COUNTRY)/AT
(INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION) SO THAT U.S. FOREIGN
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POLICY GOALS ARE ADVANCED, SECURITY IS MAINTAINED
AND EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE, AND JUDICIAL RESPONSIDILITIES ARE CARRIED OUT.
M) AS CHIEF OF MISSION YOU ARE NOT ONLY MY
REPRESENTATIVE IN (COUNTRY/INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION) BUT A SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE OF OUR NATION.
THIS IS BOTH A HIGH HONOR AND A GREAT RESPONSIDILITY. I
EXPECT YOU TO DISCHARGE THIS TRUST WITH PROFESSIONAL
EXCELLENCE, THE HIGHEST STANDARDS OF ETHICAL
CONDUCT, AND DIPLOMATIC DISCRETION....
N) ALWAYS KEEP IN MIND THAT, FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND
PEOPLE OF (COUNTRY)/THE SECRETARIAT AND OTHER
REPRESENTATIVES TO (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION),
YOU AND YOUR MISSION SYMBOLIZE THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND ITS VALUES. NEVER FORGET THE SOLEMN DUTY
THAT WE, AS PUBLIC SERVANTS, OWE TO THE CITIZENS OF
AMERICA-THE ACTIVE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF
THEIR WELL-BEING, SAFETY, AND IDEALS. THERE IS NO BETTER
DEFINITION OF AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST AND NO
LOFTIER OBJECT FOR OUR EFFORTS.
SINCERELY,
(SIGNED)
BILL CLINTON
END TEXT.
BT
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ANNEXA4-3

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
(SROE)

[NOTE: This annex is a reprint of Enclosure A, Chainnan, ]CS Instruction
3121.01 (1 Oct 94), which is the unclassified portion of that instruction. Within
Enclosure A, there are references to its Appendix A as well as to Enclosures Band
C and the Glossary of the C]SC instruction. However, those referenced
documents are classified and are not reproduced here.]
STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR US FORCES
1. Purpose and Scope.

a. The purpose of these SROE is to provide implementation guidance on
the inherent right and obligation of self-defense and the application of force for
mission accomplishment. The SROE establish fundamental policies and
procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. force commanders during
all military operations, contingencies, or prolonged conflicts. In order to provide
unifonn training and planning capabilities, this document is authorized for
distribution to commanders at all levels to be used as fundamental guidance for
training and directing their forces.
b. Except as augmented by supplemental rules of engagement for specific
operations, missions, or projects, the policies and procedures established herein
remain in effect until rescinded.
c. U.S. forces operating with multinational forces:
(1) U.S. forces assigned to the operational control (OPCON) of a
multinational force will follow the ROE of the multinational force unless
otherwise directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA). U.S. forces
will be assigned and remain OPCON to a multinational force only if the
combatant commander and higher authority determine that the ROE for that
multinational force are consistent with the policy guidance on unit self-defense
and with the rules for individual self-defense contained in this document.
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(2) When U.S. forces, under U.S. OPCON, operate in conjunction
with a multinational force, reasonable efforts will be made to effect common
ROE. Ifsuch ROE cannot be established, U.S. forces will exercise the right and
obligation of self-defense contained in this document while seeking guidance
from the appropriate combatant command. To avoid mutual interference, the
multinational forces will be informed prior to U.S. participation in the operation
of the U.S. forces' intentions to operate under these SROE and to exercise unit
self-defense. For additional guidance concerning peace operations, see
Appendix A to Enclosure A.
(3) Participation in multinational operations may be complicated by
varying national obligations derived from international agreements, i.e., other
members in a coalition may not be signatories to treaties that bind the United
States, or they may be bound by treaties to which the United States is not a party.
U.S. forces still remain bound by U.S. treaty obligations even if the other
members in a coalition are not signatories to a treaty and need not adhere to its
terms.
d. Commanders of U.S. forces subject to international agreements
governing their presence in foreign countries (e.g., Status of Forces Agreements)
are not relieved of the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary
means available and to take all appropriate action for unit self-defense.
e. U.S. forces in support of operations not under operational or tactical
control of a combatant commander or performing missions under direct control
of the NCA, Military Departments, or other U.S. government
departments/agencies (i.e., marine security guards, certain special security
forces) will operate under use-of-force or ROE promulgated by those
departments or agencies.

£ U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) units and units under USCG OPCON
conducting law enforcement operations, and USCG personnel using their law
enforcement authority, will follow the use-of-force policy issued by the
Commandant, USCG. Nothing in the USCG use-of-force policy negates a
commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means
available and to take all appropriate action for unit self-defense in accordance
with these SROE.
g. The guidance in this document does not cover U.S. forces deployed to
assist federal and local authorities during times of civil disturbance within the
territorial jurisdiction ofany state, the District of Columbia, Commonwealths of
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Puerto Rico and the Northern Marianas, U.S. possessions, and U.S. territories.
Forces in these situations will follow use-of-force policy found in DOD Civil
Disturbance Plan, "Garden Plot" (Appendix 1 to Annex C of Garden Plot).
h. U.S. forces deployed to assist foreign, federal, and local authorities in
disaster assistance missions, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, will follow
use-of-force guidelines as set forth in the mission's execute order and subsequent
orders.
i. U.S. forces will always comply with the Law of Armed Conflict.
However, not all situations involving the use of force are armed conflicts under
international law. Those approving operational rules of engagement must
determine if the internationally recognized Law of Armed Conflict applies. In
those circumstances when armed conflict, under international law, does not
exist, Law ofArmed Conflict principles may, nevertheless, be applied as a matter
of national policy. If armed conflict occurs, the actions of U.S. forces will be
governed by both the Law of Armed Conflict and rules of engagement.

2. Policy.
a. THESE RULES DO NOT LIMIT A COMMANDER'S INHERENT AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION TO USE ALL NECESSARY
MEANS AVAILABLE AND TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE ACTION IN
SELF-DEFENSE OF THE COMMANDER'S UNIT AND OTHER U.S.
FORCES IN THE VICINITY.
b. U.S. national security policy serves to protect the United States, U.S.
forces, and, in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens and their property, U.S.
commercial assets, and other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals, and
their property from hostile attack. U.S. national security policy is guided, in part,
by the need to maintain a stable international environment compatible with U.S.
national security interests. In addition, U.S. national security interests guide our
global objectives of deterring armed attack against the United States across the
range of military operations, defeating an attack should deterrence fail, and
preventing or neutralizing hostile efforts to intimidate or coerce the United
States by the threat or use of armed force or terrorist actions. Deterrence requires
clear and evident capability and resolve to fight at any level of conflict and, if
necessary, to increase deterrent force capabilities and posture deliberately so that
any potential aggressor will assess its own risks as unacceptable. U.S. policy,
should deterrence fail, provides flexibility to respond to crises with options that:
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(1) Are proportional to the provocation.
(2) Are designed to limit the scope and intensity of the conflict.
(3) Will discourage escalation.
(4) Will achieve political and military objectives.
3. Intent. These SROE are intended to:

a. Provide general guidelines on self-defense and are applicable worldwide
to all echelons of command.
b. Provide guidance governing the use of force consistent with mission
accomplishment.
c. Be used in operations other than war, during transition from peacetime
to armed conflict or war, ~nd during armed conflict in the absence ofsuperseding
guidance.
4. Combatant Commanders' SROE.

a. Combatant commanders may augment these SROE as necessary to
reflect changing political and military policies, threats, and missions specific to
their AOR. When specific standing rules governing the use of force in a
combatant commander's AOR are required that are different from these SROE,
they will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint ChiefS of Staff for NCA
approval as necessary and promulgated by the Joint Staff as an Annex to
Enclosure C of these SROE.
b. Combatant commanders will distribute these SROE to subordinate
commanders and units for compliance. The mechanism for disseminating ROE
supplemental measures is set forth in Enclosure B.
5. Definitions.

a. Inherent R~ht if Self-Deftnse. A commander has the authority and
obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action to
defend that commander's unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity from a hostile
act or demonstrated hostile intent. Neither these rules nor the supplemental
measures activated to augment these rules limit this inherent right and
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obligation. At all times, however, the requirements of necessity and
proportionality as amplified in these SROE will be the basis for the judgment of
the commander as to what constitutes an appropriate response to a particular
hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.
b. National Self-Dqense. National self-defense is the act of defending the
United States, U.S. forces, and, in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens and their
property, U.S. commercial assets, and other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign
nationals and their property, from a hostile act or hostile intent. Once a force or
terrorist unit is declared hostile by appropriate authority exercising the right and
obligation of national self-defense (see paragraph 2 of Appendix A to Enclosure
A), individual U.S. units do not need to observe a hostile act or determine hostile
intent before engaging that force.
NOTE: Collective Self-Difense, as a subset of national self-defense, is the act of
defending other designated non-U.S. forces, personnel and their property from a
hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. Only the NCA may authorize U.S.
forces to exercise collective self-defense.
c. Unit Self-Dqense. Unit self-defense is the act of defending a particular
unit of U.S. forces, including elements or personnel thereof, and other U.S.
forces in the vicinity, against a hostile act or hostile intent. The need to exercise
unit self-defense may arise in many situations such as localized low-level
conflicts, humanitarian efforts, peace enforcement actions, terrorist response, or
prolonged engagements. Individual self-defense is a subset of unit self-defense:
see the Glossary for a definition of individual self-defense.
d. Elements of Self-Dqense. The application of armed force in self-defense
requires the following two elements:
(1) Necessity. A hostile act occurs or a force or terrorist unit exhibits
hostile intent.
(2) Proportionality. The force used must be reasonable in intensity,
duration, and magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander at the time,
to decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent and to ensure the continued
safety of U.S. forces.

e. Hostile Act. A hostile act is an attack or other use of force by a foreign
force or terrorist unit (organization or individual) against the United States, U.S.
forces, and in certain circumstance, U.S. citizens, their property, U.S.
commercial assets, and other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals and
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their property. It is also force used directly to preclude or impede the mission
and/ or duties ofU .S. forces, including the recovery ofU .S. personnel and U.S.
government property. When a hostile act is in progress, the right exists to use
proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all necessary means
available to deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy
the threat. (See definitions in the Glossary for amplification.)

£ Hostile Intent. Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force by a
foreign force or terrorist unit (organization or individual) against the United
States, U.S. forces, and in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens, their property,
U.S. commercial assets, or other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals
and their property. When hostile intent is present, the right exists to use
proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all necessary means
available to deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy
the threat. (See definitions in the Glossary for amplification.)
g. Hostile Force. Any force or terrorist unit (civilian, paramilitary, or
military), with or without national designation, that has committed a hostile act,
demonstrated hostile intent, or has been declared hostile.
6. Declarin~ Force Hostile. Once a force is declared hostile by appropriate
authority, U.S. units need not observe a hostile act or a demonstration of hostile
intent before engaging that force. The responsibility for exercising the right and
obligation of national self-defense and declaring a force hostile is a matter of the
utmost importance demanding considerable judgement of command. All
available intelligence, the status of international relationships, the requirements
of international law, the possible need for a political decision, and the potential
consequences for the United States must be carefully weighed. Exercising the
right and obligation of national self-defense by competent authority is in
addition to and does not supplant the right and obligation to exercise unit
self-defense. The authority to declare a force hostile is limited as amplified in
Appendix A to Enclosure A.
7. Authority to Exercise Self-Deftnse.

a. National Self-Deftnse. The authority to exercise national self-defense is
outlined in Appendix A to Enclosure A.
b. Collective Self-Deftnse. Only the NCA may authorize the exerCIse of
collective self-defense.
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c. Unit Self-Difense. A unit conunander has the authority and obligation to
use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action to defend the
unit, including elements and personnel thereof, or other u.s. forces in the
vicinity, against a hostile act or hostile intent. In defending against a hostile act or
hostile intent under these SROE, unit commanders should use only that degree
of force necessary to decisively counter the hostile intent and to ensure the
continued safety of U.S. forces.

8. Action in Self-Difense.
a. Means of Self-Difense. All necessary means available and all appropriate
actions may be used in self-defense. The following guidelines apply for unit or
national self-defense:

(1) Attempt to Control Without the Use of Force. The use of force is
normally a measure of last resort. When time and circumstances permit, the
potentially hostile force should be warned and given the opportunity to
withdraw or cease threatening actions. (See Appendix A to Enclosure A for
amplification. )
(2) Use Proportional Force to Control the Situation. When the use of force
in self-defense is necessary, the nature, duration, and scope of the engagement
should not exceed that which is required to decisively counter the hostile act or
hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety ofU .S. forces or other protected
personnel or property.
(3) Attack to Disable or Destroy. An attack to disable or destroy a hostile
force is authorized when such action is the only prudent means which a hostile
act or hostile intent can be prevented or terminated. When such conditions exist,
engagement is authorized only until the hostile force no longer poses an
imminent threat.
b. Immediate Pursuit of Hostile Foreign Forces. In self-defense, U.S. forces may
pursue and engage a hostile force that has committed a hostile act or
demonstrated hostile intent and that remains an imminent threat. (See Appendix
A to Enclosure A for amplification.)
c. Difending U.S. Citizens, Property, and Designated Foreign Nationals.

(1) Within a Foreign Nation's U.S. Recognized Territory or Territorial
Airspace. A foreign nation has the principal responsibility for defending U.S.
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citizens and property within these areas. (See Appendix A to Enclosure A for
amplification. )
(2) At Sea. Detailed guidance is contained in Annex A to Appendix B of
this enclosure.
(3) In International Airspace. Protecting civil aircraft in international
airspace is principally the responsibility of the nation of registry. Guidance for
certain cases of actual or suspected hijacking of airborne U.S. or foreign civil
aircraft is contained in MCM-102-92, 24July 1992, Hijacking of Civil Aircraft.
(4) Terrorism. Terrorist attacks are usually undertaken by civilian or
paramilitary organizations, or by individuals under circumstances in which a
determination of hostile intent may be difficult. The definitions of hostile act and
hostile intent set forth above will be used in situations where terrorist attacks are
likely. The term "hostile force" includes terrorist units when used in this
document. When circumstances and intelligence dictate, supplemental ROE
will be used to meet this special threat.

(5) Piracy. Piracy is defined as an illegal act of violence, depredation
(i.e., plundering, robbing, or pillaging), or detention in or over international
waters committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or
aircraft against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property on board
such ship or aircraft. U.S. warships and aircraft have an obligation to repress
piracy on or over international waters directed against any vessel, or aircraft,
whether U.S. or foreign flagged. If a pirate vessel or aircraft fleeing from pursuit
proceeds into the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or supeJjacent airspace of
another country every effort should be made to obtain the consent of nation
sovereignty to continue pursuit. Where circumstances permit, commanders will
seek guidance from higher authority before using armed force to repress an act of
pIracy.
d. Operations Within or in the Vicinity
Involvinf!. the United States.

of Hostile

Fire or Combat Zones Not

(1) U.S. forces should not enter, or remain in, a zone in which
hostilities (not involving the United States) are imminent or occurring between
foreign forces unless directed by proper authority.
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(2) If a force commits a hostile act or demonstrates hostile intent against
U.S. forces in a hostile fire or combat zone, the commander is obligated to act in
unit self-defense in accordance with SROE guidelines.
e. Right ifAssistance Entry.

(1) Ships, or under certain circumstances aircraft, have the right to
enter a foreign territorial sea or archipelagic waters and corresponding airspace
without the permission of the coastal or island state to engage in legitimate efforts
to render emergency assistance to those in danger or distress from perils of the
sea.
(2) Right of assistance extends only to rescues where the location of
those in danger is reasonably well known. It does not extend to entering the
territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or national airspace to conduct a search.
(3) For ships and aircraft rendering assistance on scene, the right and
obligation of self-defense extends to and includes persons, vessels, or aircraft
being assisted. The right of self-defense in such circumstances does not include
interference with legitimate law enforcement actions of a coastal nation.
However, once received on board the assisting ship or aircraft, persons assisted
will not be surrendered to foreign authority unless directed by the NCA.
(4) Further guidance for the exercise of the right of assistance entry is
contained in C]CS Instruction 2410.01, 20 July 1993, "Guidance for the
Exercise of Right of Assistance Entry."
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TABLEA4-1
STATES wmCH HAVE RATIFIED
THE PROTOCOL RELATING TO AN AMENDMENT TO THE
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
ARTICLE 3 bis, SIGNED AT MONTREAL ON 10 MAY 1984
(As of 4 November 1997)

Barbados
Chile
Austria
Oman
Republic of Korea
Tunisia
Senegal
Luxembourg
Ethiopia
Pakistan
South Africa
Togo
Nigeria
Thailand
Egypt
Seychelles
France
Belgium
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
Spain
Switzerland
Bangladesh
Italy
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Australia
Madagascar
Canada
Jordan
Argentina
Netherlands
Brazil
United Arab Emirates
Mali
Panama
Cote d'Ivoire
United Kingdom
Uruguay
Guatemala
Greece
Nepal
Cameroon
Lesotho

23 Nov 1984
26 Nov 1984
11 Jan 1985
21 Feb 1985
27 Feb 1985
29 Apr 1985
2 May 1985
10May1985
22 May 1985
10Jun 1985
28 Jun 1985
5 Jul1985
8Jul1985
12Jul1985
1 Aug 1985
8 Aug 1985
19 Aug 1985
20 Sep 1985
16 Oct 1985
16 Oct 1985
16 Oct 1985
24 Oct 1985
24 Feb 1986
3 Jun 1986
12Jun 1986
18Jul1986
21 Jul1986
10Sep 1986
10 Sep 1986
23 Sep 1986
8 Oct 1986
1 Dec 1986
18 Dec 1986
21 Jan 1987
18 Feb 1987
4 Mar 1987
22 May 1987
5 Jun 1987
21 Aug 1987
11 Sep 1987
18 Sep 1987
26 Oct 1987
26 Oct 1987
28Jan 1988
17 Mar1988

Niger
Ecuador
Guyana
Antigua and Barbuda
Gabon
Colombia
Cyprus
Mauritius
Bahrain
Hungary
Mexico
Morocco
Russian Federation
Ireland
Qatar
Malawi
Portugal
Burundi
Finland
Estonia
Fiji
Papua New Guinea
Monaco
Turkmenistan
Czech Republic
Uzbekistan
Malta
Croatia
Eritrea
Iran
Lebanon
San Marino
Slovakia
Uganda
Kenya
Germany
Belarus
Libya
Maldives
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Moldova
Ghana
China
Belize
Israel

Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Legal Bureau, MontreaL

8 Apr 1988
22 Apr 1988
2 May 1988
17 Oct 1988
1 Nov 1988
10 Mar 1989
5Jul1989
7 Nov 1989
7 Feb 1990
24 May 1990
20Jun 1990
19 Jul1990
24 Aug 1990
19 Sep 1990
23 Oct 1990
13 Dec 1990
17 Jun 1991
10 Oct 1991
18 Dec 1991
21 Aug 1992
21 Sep 1992
5 Oct 1992
27 Jan 1993
14 Apr 1993
15 Apr 1993
24 Feb 1994
25 Mar 1994
6 May 1994
27 May 1994
17 Jun 1994
14 Dec 1994
3 Feb 1995
20 Mar 1995
7Jul1995
5 Oct 1995
2Jul1996
24 Jul1996
28 Oct 1996
8 Apr 1997
9 May 1997
20 Jun 1997
15 Jul1997
23Jul1997
24 Sep 1997
30 Sep 1997

